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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model of housing cycles in a two good economy.
We establish that nonsubstitutability between housing services and other com-
modities along with high degree of heterogeneity in home ownership may lead to
a stable spiral path converging to a steady-state equilibrium of rental price and
housing stock. Key conditions for stability are a suﬃciently sticky rent adjustment
dynamics and a relatively rapid depreciation of per capita housing stock.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, we have witnessed a very long boom episode followed by
a sharp and a prolonged bust in the prices of houses in many parts of the
world. In the World Economic Outlook 2008, IMF (2008) reports the per-
cent increase in house prices, during the period 1997 to 2007 that is not ac-
counted for by the fundamental drivers of house prices, ranging from around
30 percent to around 10 percent for the countries Ireland, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, Austria, France, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Spain,
Sweden, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Over a broader time interval,
∗All the views expressed in this paper belong to the authors and do not represent those
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1Shiller (2005) shows that inﬂation-adjusted U.S. home prices increased 0.7%
per year from 1940 to 2004. Before the bust that started in year 2007, the
perception of a seemingly endless housing boom was widespread. The av-
erage annual increase in the Case-Shiller home price index for the United
States during the 2002-2006 period in contrast was above 12%.
Many policy related reasons, like low interest for a prolonged time period,
have been put forward in order to explain these signiﬁcant and prolonged
price swings. The tax deductibility of mortgage payments in the U.S. is an-
other frequently cited distortion. A legal system that facilitates ‘strategic
defaults’ or so called ‘jingle mails’ in case of negative equity is a third com-
monly cited reason. Presence and widespread promotion of adjustable rate
mortgages is a fourth frequently cited culprit. But in fact in many diﬀer-
ent countries without such legal structures or economic policies, we observe
similar prolonged boom-bust cycles in their housing markets as well.
The natural question then becomes whether there is a more fundamental
structural economic reason that produces these cycles, a reason, which is not
captured by the economic models of housing that we currently use. In this
regard, Shiller (1990) brings to our attention the observation that the eco-
nomic theorist’s understanding of ‘equilibrium in the housing market’ is not
shared at all by the man on the street. Prices rise because there is ‘shortage
of supply’ is the typical answer when people with little economic training are
asked about the reason behind endured periods of price increases. But we,
economists by training, know that prices always adjust so that demand and
supply are always equal to each other. But then given what has been and
currently is happening in the housing market, could it be true that it is in
fact economic theory that is missing something that the man on the street
actually knows?
The answer is ‘no’ for economic theory in general, but ‘yes’ in particular
for the Marshallian models of housing demand. The Marshallian partial
equilibrium model is missing two signiﬁcant aspects. The ﬁrst important
aspect that is missing is the presence of rental contracts that obviously avoid
immediate price adjustment for rents. Second is the possibility a housing
demand curve that may be positively sloped at some range of prices. The ﬁrst
aspect may give rise to a temporary disequilibrium and a mismatch between
demand and supply for a relatively long period. The second aspect may give
rise to the presence of more than one equilibrium house price. If you have
more than one equilibrium, we know that necessarily at least one of them
turns out to be unstable. But can a demand curve ever be positively sloped?
2Marshallian partial equilibrium theory says no, while general equilibrium
theory admits this possibility. The intuition is the income eﬀect that comes
with higher prices, in case there is a group of people specialized in providing
housing services.
Thanks to seminal works in general equilibrium theory, like Arrow and
Hurwicz (1958) and Hahn (1958), we have known for the last ﬁve decades that
uniqueness and stability of competitive general equilibrium is an almost im-
possible luxury to have. Uniqueness and stability of equilibrium hinges upon
a condition called ‘gross substitutability’. This condition basically requires
all goods to be highly substitutable with every other good in the economy.
This is something very unlikely to be true, if not impossible.
Substitution between housing services and items like food and energy is
not very likely. If in addition there is a high degree of specialization in pro-
vision of say food (or energy) items versus housing services, a simple algebra
can show that three rather than one price that equate demand and supply is
a possibility. In fact, this exercise has been carried out by Ba¸ sçı and Saglam
(2008). Out of the three market clearing rental rates the lowest and highest
ones turn out to be stable, while the one in the middle is unstable. The
range between the two stable equilibria depends on two things: the extent of
specialization and degree of substitutability between housing and other com-
modities. This has an interesting implication. Extreme specialization that
usually comes together with trade and capital account liberalization may in-
deed be the fundamental structural reason for higher amplitude of worldwide
housing cycles.
On the other hand, several studies, including Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987), Calvo (1983) and Mankiw (1985), reminded economists of various
institutional reasons for the presence of ‘sticky prices’ and the macro eco-
nomic signiﬁcance of this stickiness. In the housing market for instance,
the presence of ‘rental contracts’ is an obvious obstacle against immediate
market clearing. Indeed, a careful look at the subitems of the consumer
price index in the U.S., or elsewhere, shows prolonged periods of real rent
increases as well as decreases. The price adjustments here are actually ob-
served not to be rapid at all. In short, not the economic theory itself but the
missing link between sophisticated general equilibrium models that admit
multiple equilibria and the speedy advice needs of policy makers fulﬁlled by
rather simplistic Marshallian models seems to be the problem in modelling
the housing markets.
In this paper, we attempt to provide a possible theoretical explanation
3for the relation between rent stickiness and stability of housing cycles by
analysing the equilibrium dynamics of a simple two-good economy with in-
complete markets and strong income eﬀects.
In our model, we focus solely on the determination of rental rates by
recognising the importance of the present level and future growth prospects
of rents in valuation of homes.1 We consider a dynamic setup that uses the
assumption of zero substitutability between housing and other commodities,
an extreme among many cases studied in the static general equilibrium model
of Ba¸ sçı and Saglam (2008).2 Ba¸ sçı and Saglam (2008) assume a low degree
of substitutability between housing services and other commodities together
with a low share of owner-occupied houses, and establish that regions or
economies with a low share of owner-occupied houses are more prone to
housing cycles that are driven by locally unstable rent dynamics.
Our model involves two producer-consumers who can produce either hous-
ing services or a nonhousing good.3 Each consumer derives utility from the
consumption of both goods, while substitution between the goods is negli-
gible.4 Besides, intertemporal trade is not possible either, as we focus on
an incomplete market setup. On the supply side, we assume that the stock
of (per capita) housing depreciates at a constant instantaneous rate while
investments by one of the consumers in the housing sector leads to an in-
stantaneous gross addition through an investment function of the rental price.
On the other hand, for the dynamic adjustment of housing rents, we con-
sider a tâtonnement process, in which rents tend to increase in response to
1See Smith and Smith, 2006.
2The only other general equilibrium asset pricing with housing model that we are aware
of is by Piazzessi et al. (2007). But they assert uniqueness of equilibrium upfront via a
high substitution elasticity parameter.
3A basic reason for heterogeneity in house ownership is the life cycle. JCHS (2008)
classiﬁes, in The State of the Nation’s Housing 2008, homeownership rates in the United
States in 2007 by age groups. For ages under 35, the homeownership rate is 41,7 while
the ﬁgure becomes 67,8 for ages 35-44, 75,4 for ages 45-54, 80,6 for ages 55-64, 82,0 for
ages 65-74, and 78,7 for ages 75 and over. Such heterogeneity yields a strong income eﬀect
for home owners due to changes in rental rates, which has also been identiﬁed empirically
(see, for example, Kenny, 1999). Ba¸ sçı and Saglam (2008) elaborate on the theoretical
possibility of a positively sloped demand function for housing services when there are
strong income eﬀects stemming from endowment heterogeneity. Dusansky and Koç (2007)
obtain the same theoretical possibility in an intertemporal model of consumption, which
is also supported by their econometric analysis of housing data from Florida.
4For a discussion on the poor evidence in the literature for a low degree of substitution
between housing and nonhousing services, see Ba¸ sçı and Saglam (2008).
4the current level of excess demand for housing.
We establish that nonsubstitutability between housing and nonhousing
services along with heterogeneity of individuals with respect to their endow-
ments (supplies) leads to a stable (spiral) path converging to a steady-state
equilibrium if the rental price of housing is suﬃciently sticky or the depre-
ciation of housing is suﬃciently high. We also present some results for the
comparative statics of the steady-state equilibrium.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and Section 3 presents our results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider an exchange economy involving two producer-consumers who are
indexed by i = 1,2 and live over the time interval [0,∞). Time is denoted by
t. At each time, there are two goods in the economy, indexed by g = n,h with
n and h denoting nonhousing and housing respectively. We normalize the
price of nonhousing to 1 at each time point, and denote by r(t) the relative
real rental rate of housing at time t.5
Let S
g
i (t) denote the supply of good g produced by individual i at time
t. We assume that at each time point housing is produced by individual 1,
while nonhousing by individual 2, solely; i.e., Sn
1(t) = 0 and Sh
2(t) = 0 for
all t. We normalize the supply of nonhousing, Sn
2(t), to 1 for all t; hence the
variable Sh
1(t) denotes the relative supply of housing in the economy at time
t.
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of both goods; however
substitution between housing and nonhousing is not possible. Let c
g
i(t) de-
note the time-t consumption of good g by individual i, whose utility is rep-




















5As for housing services, we consider only pure dwelling services, i.e. what the rent is
paid for, excluding costs of utilities.
6Since we consider an incomplete market setup, intertemporal trade is not possible.
5s.t. c
n
i (t) + r(t)c
h
i (t) = S
n
i (t) + r(t)S
h
i (t)
We denote the solution to the problem of consumer i at time t by the pair
￿cn
i (r(t)),ch
i (r(t))￿ for a given rental rate r(t).















2(r(t)) for any positive r(t).
Consumers will have endowment (supply) bias if at each time they plan
to consume relatively more from the endowed (supplied) good for each posi-
tive rental rate.7 Here, we immediately note that condition (1) implies that
consumers will have endowment bias if 1/a2 < Sh
1(t) < 1/a1 for all t.
3 Results
Using the budget constraints of the consumers along with the normalization
Sn
2(t) = 1 for all t, we ﬁnd the optimal quantity of housing demanded by
















respectively. Then, at time t, the aggregate demand for housing at a given















7The term ‘endowment bias’ was introduced into the housing cycle/bubble literature
by Ba¸ sçı and Saglam (2008), with an address to the presence of transaction costs in trade
as a possible interpretation. For a well-known use of endowment bias in the theory of
ﬁnance, in the sense of attributing a higher value to an asset due to one’s ownership of it,
see Kahneman et al. (1991).
6Now, deﬁne the excess housing demand Xh(r(t)) = Dh(r(t))−Sh
1(t). Equat-
ing it to zero we obtain the equilibrium rental rate:
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As already shown by Basci and Saglam (2008), the rental rate satisfying
(5) is positive and clears the goods markets if consumers have endowment
bias.8
We henceforth assume that consumers have endowment bias, and start
to analyze the equilibrium dynamics of the model to show the possibility of
a housing cycle. On the supply side, we assume that the stock of housing
depreciates9 at a constant instantaneous rate δ ≥ 0 while investments of
individual 1 to the housing sector leads to an instantaneous gross addition of
I(r(t)), through the investment function I that admits as its argument the
variable r(t). We assume I￿(r) = θ > 0 and I￿￿(r) = 0 for r > 1. Moreover,
investment is irreversible,10 i.e., I(r) = 0 for r ≤ 1. Then, the supply of





θ(r(t) − 1) − δSh
1(t) if r > 1
−δSh
1(t) if r ≤ 1 (6)
For the dynamic adjustment of the housing rents, we consider the follow-
ing tâtonnement process:













where γ > 0 is a constant. Here, we have implicitly assumed that the logical
time of the iterations performed by a Walrasian auctioneer coincides with
the real time t.
8The proof follows from (5), Deﬁnition 1, and Walras’ Law.
9The depreciation rate δ can also be interpreted as the population growth rate in a
demographic model of housing.
10Such an investment function can be obtained as an equilibrium behavior in an in-
tertemporal model that involves individuals of type 1 who derive utility from leisure and
decide in each period how much leisure to convert (through a housing production func-
tion) into housing. Clearly, the comparison between the marginal utility of leasure that can
simply be normalized to ‘one’ and the rental price of housing would lead to the assumed
discontinuity in the marginal propensity to investment.




1 = 0 when r > 1, the equation of the ﬁrst phase locus is
implicitly deﬁned by the condition that depreciated housing stock be equal






(r(t) − 1). (8)
Clearly, ˙ Sh





= −δ < 0; (9)
so Sh
1 increases over time above the ˙ Sh
1 = 0 locus, as indicated by the hori-
zontal arrows of motion in Figure 1.
The second phase locus (˙ r = 0) is deﬁned by the condition that the excess
housing demand be zero or the rental rate r(t) be equal to re(t). So, we plot
˙ r = 0 locus as equation (5) over the range 1/a2 < Sh
1(t) < 1/a1, where
















so r increases over time above the ˙ r = 0 locus, as indicated by the vertical
arrows of motion in Figure 1.
Inserting the two phase loci leads to us to state our ﬁrst result.






























∗ − 1). (12)
8Using (11)-(12), we immediately obtain the following results for the com-
parative statics of the steady-state equilibrium.
Corollary 1. The steady-state rental rate of housing r∗ and the steady-state
housing stock (Sh
1)∗ are decreasing in a1, a2, θ and increasing in δ.
The phase diagram of the dynamical system represented by (6)-(7) is
plotted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Phase Diagram
We notice that on a trajectory starting from any point in Region I, the
increase in the housing stock is insuﬃcient to meet the rise in the demand for
housing, thus excess demand for housing pushes the rental rate further up
and builds up a bubble. As the trajectory hits Region II, the rental rate of
housing reaches to its highest level while the demand for housing collapses.
The new additions to the housing stock in Region II can now create an
9excess supply and the rental rate of housing starts to fall; the beginning of
the collapse of the bubble. The net investment in housing eventually stops as
the trajectory hits Region III and the stock of housing attains its maximum.
In Region III, the demand for housing is so poor that there still remains
an excess supply despite the contraction in the stock of housing. While the
trajectory hits Region IV, the rental rate of housing attains its minimum
level ever. In this fourth region of the spiral trajectory, the demand starts
to recover while the stock of housing still remains to fall; hence the resulting
excess demand for housing starts to push the rental rate up again; the rise of
a new bubble albeit with a reduced amplitude. While the trajectory leaves
Region IV, the stock of housing reaches to its minimum level.
To characterize conditions that will ensure the assumed convergence of the
trajectory drawn in Figure 1 towards the long-run equilibrium, we linearize
the diﬀerential system (6)-(7) around the steady state point (r∗,(Sh
1)∗) and






















The linearized system has a stable spiral point if the trace of the above
coeﬃcient matrix is negative; i.e.,
−δ +
γa1θr∗
δ(a1 + r∗)2 −
γ
(a2 + r∗)2 < 0.
This condition can be rewritten as γ < δ/Dh
r(r∗,(Sh
1)∗), where the right-hand
side of the inequality is independent of the parameter γ. This leads us to
state the following result.
Proposition 2. The steady state (r∗,(Sh
1)∗) is a stable spiral if the speed of
the tâtonnement adjustment is so low as to satisfy γ < δ/Dh
r(r∗,(Sh
1)∗).
Apparently, when γ is too high or when the depreciation rate δ is too
low, the dynamic system has a spiral which is unstable. An explanation for
why γ can be low, i.e. rental rates are sticky, may be the presence of explicit
and/or implicit contracts between owners and renters of houses.
104 Conclusions
In this paper, we attempted to provide a basic theoretical framework to
explore the key derivers of ﬂuctuations in rental prices and housing stock
around their long-run equilibrium level in a two good economy involving two
representative producer-consumers.
We have established that nonsubstitutability between housing services
and other nonhousing commodities and full specialization in the production
of goods altogether lead to the presence of a positively sloped aggregate
demand for housing services and a locally unstable rental dynamics with
a ﬁxed supply housing. When the supply is also made endogenous, the
possibility of a stable spiral converging to the long-run levels of housing stock
and rental price hinges upon the rental price of housing being suﬃciently
sticky.
We should here emphasize that to drive our results the heterogeneity of
home ownership is essential while the assumed zero substitutability between
housing services and other nonhousing commodities can be relaxed by assum-
ing suﬃciently low elasticities of substitution like in the static ﬁxed house
supply model of Ba¸ sçı and Saglam (2008).11 In that case, one could expect
multiple steady-state equilibria involving unstable ones.
We ﬁnally note that future research need to study the intertemporal as-
pects of consumer choice of housing services by explicitly introducing in-
tertemporal trade possibilities in our model.12 An arbitrage condition in the
economy would enable one to ﬁnd the linkage between the selling price/rental
rate of a unit of housing and the short-run interest rate in the asset market.
Hence, one may also deal in the extended model with several policy questions
including how the government of the described economy can act against price
and rental cycles in the housing sector.
11Ba¸ sçı and Saglam (2008) obtain three equilibria for suﬃciently low elasticities of sub-
stitution corresponding to utility functions of the CES family. As the utility functions
of consumers converge to a Leontief function, the lowest of the equilibrium rental rates
converges to zero while the highest one goes to inﬁnity. Moreover, the lowest and highest
of the equilibrium rental rates are found to be stable while the one in between is unstable.
12A pioneering work in the housing literature by Poterba (1984) already studies the
dynamic equilibrium of the housing market using an asset market approach.
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